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Meeting the Demands of Workers into the
Twenty-First Century:
The Future of Labor and Employment Lawt
KENNETH G. DAU-SCHMIDT*
INTRODUCTION
During roughly the period 1750-1900, technological advances in production,
transportation, and finance gave rise to the modem industrial corporation and
a class of wage earners with interests and demands that were fundamentally
divergent from those of their employers.' Prior to this period, production was
undertaken in small shops with one master supervising a few journeymen who
would eventually become masters of their own shops. Although the interests
of journeymen and masters may have diverged at a given point in time, there
was no fundamental difference in their interests over the course of their lives
since journeymen could reasonably expect that any advantages enjoyed by
masters under this system of production would eventually also be bestowed
on them. However, with the development of improved methods of production,
transportation, and capitalization, the optimal size of the shop grew so that
one master could supervise many workers, very few of whom could
realistically expect to one day run their own shop.2 Thus, with the develop-
ment of the modern industrial corporation, there also developed a wage labor
class with interests and demands that were completely divorced from the
interests of their employers.
Since the birth of this wage class, American society has struggled with the
problem of how to meet their demands and has employed several methods
toward this end. The first means that was employed to address the demands
t © Copyright 1993 by Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt. All rights reserved.
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. B.A., University of
Wisconsin, 1978; M.A., University of Michigan, 1981; J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 1981;
Ph.D. in Economics, University of Michigan, 1984. I would like to thank the members of the Indiana
Law Journal for inviting the faculty to contribute the pieces that make up this sesquicentennial issue.
Among the festivities that have been planned to commemorate the Law School's sesquicentennial year,
I can think of no more fitting celebration of the Law School and its contribution to legal scholarship
than this sesquicentennial issue. I would also like to thank Terry Bethel, Bruce Markell, and Henry
Perritt for useful comments on this Essay and Carl Greci for useful research assistance. This Essay is
dedicated to my life partner, Elizabeth Birch, whose love, devotion, and hard work have allowed me to
achieve whatever success in academics I have enjoyed to date.
1. ARCHIBALD Cox ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 9-10 (11th ed. 1991); HAROLD
W. DAVEY ET AL, CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 16 (4th ed. 1982).
2. COX ET AL., supra note 1, at 9-10; DAVEY ET AL., supra note 1, at 16.
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of wage workers was individual bargaining. The problem was first left to the
courts, who applied concepts of master-servant, tort, and contract that were
developed during the pre-industrial age.3 The application of these doctrines,
with their philosophical moorings in individual rights, existing property
relationships, and freedom of contract, effectively confined the resolution of
the problems of the wage class to individual bargaining. Under these common-
law doctrines, the efforts of workers to address collectively their concerns
through organization and strikes were sometimes held to be criminal
conspiracies.4 Because the legislatures had not yet entered the fray, workers
were left to only their own individual resources in seeking accommodation
with their employer.
In time, however, this method of addressing workers' demands was found
wanting. Public sentiment increasingly reflected the view that individual
workers could not adequately address their differences with organized capital
and that the courts and common law unfairly favored employers.' Initially,
the Supreme Court blocked legislative attempts to use other solutions,
enshrining individual bargaining in the Constitution.6 However, in the face
of the economic crisis of the 1930s and executive threats to pack the Court
with members who were more sympathetic to the need to try something
different, the Court relented and allowed legislative experimentation with
other solutions.7 These solutions included direct regulation of the terms and
conditions of employment and the promotion of collective bargaining.
Congress enacted the Social Security Act8 and Fair Labor Standards Act of
3. LEROY S. MERRIFIELD ET AL., LABOR RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 6-11 (8th ed.
1989); 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 3-12 (Charles J. Morris ed., 1983); Richard A. Epstein, A
Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357,
1358-79 (1983).
4. An example is Commonwealth v. Pullis (the Philadelphia Cordwainers case), decided in the
Mayor's Court of Philadelphia in 1806. See 3 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL
SOCIETY 59 (John R. Commons et al. eds., 1910); see also People v. Melvin, 2 Wheeler Crim. 262, 268,
282 (N.Y. Gen. Sess. 1810).
5. 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 3, at 13.
6. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking down the
National Industrial Recovery Act as unconstitutional); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908)
(holding prohibition on anti-union discrimination in the Erdman Act unconstitutional), overruled by
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941); HENRY PELLING, AMERICAN LABOR 123-24 (1960)
(arguing that-child labor laws are unconstitutional).
7. Indeed, the historic "switch in time that saved nine" came in the case upholding the
constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1 (1937). Approval of the Fair Labor Standards Act came in Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel,
316 U.S. 572 (1942).
8. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 271-531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-
1397 (1988)).
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19389 to provide certain minimum standards for retirement and employment,
and the National Labor Relations Act" to actively promote collective
bargaining as a method of addressing the needs of workers. With the blessings
of the federal government, the states also enacted workers' compensation and
unemployment compensation statutes to provide minimal income security for
workers who were injured on the job or discharged for lack of work."
Congress later retreated from the strong commitment to collective bargaining
it expressed in the original National Labor Relations Act by adopting the Taft-
Hartley amendments.' Similarly, the Supreme Court, through certain
interpretations of the Act, limited the reach of its provisions. 3
Recently, the federal government and the courts have undertaken new
efforts to address the needs of wage workers. Since the early 1960s, the
federal government has undertaken a fairly ambitious regimen of legislation
regulating the employment relationship. This regimen has included enactment
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,14 the Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970,"s the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,16 the
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 17 and the Family Leave
and Medical Act of 1993.1' Also of late, the courts have addressed the
concerns of working people by, reevaluating the common-law doctrine of
9. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 1, 52 Stat. 1060, 1060 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp. 111990)).
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1988).
11. See, for example, California's Unemployment Insurance Code, CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 1-
16,010 (West 1986) and Massachusetts' Workmen's Compensation Statute, MASS. GEN. L. ch. 152, §§
1-86 (1989). Actually, workers' compensation statutes enjoyed a fair amount of success before the Great
Depression, Arthur Larson, The Nature and Origins of Worlanen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL L.Q.
206, 231-34 (1952), but unemployment compensation statutes were generally enacted in response to the
legislative scheme promoting such statutes under the Social Security Act, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-504
(1988).
12. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-161 (1988)).
13. NLRB v. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (establishing that decisions to
partially close an operation are not subject to bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA)); NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938) (establishing the right of employers
under the NLRA to permanently replace striking employees); NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S.
342 (1958) (establishing the distinction between mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining under
the NLRA).
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
15. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988).
16. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1988).
18. Family Leave and Medical Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993) (to be codified
in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 5 U.S.C., and 29 U.S.C.).
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employment at will.'9 Under this doctrine, an employee for an indefinite
term can be discharged by his or her employer for "any reason or no reason"
absent express contractual or statutory protection. 20 The courts of many
states have provided limited protection to employees from discharge under the
most egregious circumstances by extending arguments in tort and contract. 2'
This brief retrospective demonstrates that over the history of our country
American society has used at least four means to address the demands of the
wage class: individual bargaining, collective bargaining, legislative regulation
of the employment relationship, and adaptation of the common law. In this
Essay, I will assess the pros and cons of each of these methods of meeting
worker demands and examine how those demands and the American work
force have changed over time. From this rudimentary comparative institutional
analysis,22 I hope to divine something about how worker demands will be
met in the future and the future of labor and employment law.
I. METHODS OF MEETING THE DEMANDS OF WORKERS
A. Individual Bargaining
As previously mentioned, the first method that was used under American
law to address worker demands was individual bargaining. Workers were free
to negotiate individually with employers over terms of employment and to
select among offers made by competing employers.
There are several advantages to resolving worker demands through
individual bargaining. Individual bargaining allows the parties to achieve a
customized or personalized solution to individual desires or problems.
19. See Arthur S. Leonard, A New Common Law of Employment Termination, 66 N.C. L. REV. 631(1988).
20. Clarke v. Atlantic Stevedoring Co., 163 F. 423 (E.D.N.Y. 1908); Jay M. Feinman, The
Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 118 (1976).
21. See, e.g., Woolley v. Hoffiann-La Roche, Inc., 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985) (holding that worker
cannot be discharged in violation of representations made in employee handbook); Fortune v. National
Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that worker cannot be
discharged to avoid paying commissions already earned); Petermann v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Local 396, 344 P.2d 25 (Mass. 1959) (finding a public policy exception that employee at
will cannot be discharged for refusing to violate the law).
22. Each of the four methods of addressing workers' demands discussed in this Essay can be
viewed as an "institution" for meeting those demands. In assessing the relative costs and benefits of
these institutions in meeting workers' demands I undertake what has been described as a "comparative
institutional analysis." For a more complete description of comparative institutional analysis, see Neil
K. Komesar, Injuries and Institutions: Tort Reform, Tort Theory, and Beyond, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 23(1990).
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Workers vary according to their productivity and compensation needs.23
Ideally, through individual bargaining, each worker will be compensated
according to his or her marginal product in a way that meets his or her
individual needs.24 In addition, economic theory suggests that in an idealized
competitive economy, individual bargaining will result in the maximization
of total wealth.25 Assuming perfect information, zero transaction costs, and
competitive markets, workers and employers will agree to employment
contracts that accommodate workers' needs for compensation, safety, and
income security to the extent that the benefits from such provisions to the
employees exceed their costs to the employers and are warranted by the
employees' productivity. As a result, individual bargaining is attractive on
normative grounds to those who treat wealth maximization as a normative
principle.2 6 Individual bargaining is also attractive on normative grounds to
those who accept a libertarian perspective because it is the logical result of
full freedom of contract, and such bargaining allows each member of society
the greatest opportunity to pursue his or her own benefit with minimal
interference with other people's desires.
Unfortunately, there are also several practical limitations on individual
bargaining as a method of meeting worker demands. Individual workers do not
always have the resources, information, or capacity to evaluate adequately all
23. For example, workers who are young commonly have a great need for current income to raise
children, while workers who are old have a relative preference for income that is deferred until after
retirement. Similarly, workers who are single generally have less need for insurance than workers who
have families.
24. HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMics 525 (1987).
25. This observation is basically a restatement of the First Theorem of Welfare Economics that
competitive equilibria are efficient. See HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIc ANALYSIS 200 (2d ed. 1984).
26. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONoMic ANALYSIS OF LAW 10-11 (4th ed. 1992); Richard A. Posner,
The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 487, 488-502 (1980). What is commonly omitted in wealth maximization analyses, and what
makes the wealth maximization perspective an incomplete normative theory, is that, according to the
Second Theorem of Welfare Economics, the efficient solution arrived at by the competitive market
depends on the initial distribution of resources and by varying that distribution one can select among
alternate efficient solutions. VARIAN, supra note 25, at 200-01. Accordingly, one needs a theory of the
appropriate distribution of resources in society in order to complete wealth maximization as a
determinative normative theory for social policy. Cento G. Veljanovski, Wealth Maximization, Law &
Ethics-On the Limits of Economic Efficiency, 1 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 5 (1981).
27. Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947 (1984); Epstein,
supra note 3. Indeed, at least as proffered by Professor Epstein, the libertarian analysis of the
employment relationship is very close to the wealth maximization analysis, id. at 1380, and suffers from
the same deficiency of ignoring distributional questions. Compare Charles Fried, Individual and
Collective Rights in Work Relations: Reflections on the Current State of Labor Law and Its Prospects,
51 U. CHI. L. REv. 1012, 1016-17 (1984) with sources cited supra note 26.
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the risks they encounter in the workplace.28 This seems particularly true of
highly technical or long-term latent risks, such as those that arise from
exposure to harmful chemicals, but it may also be true of other risks, such as
the risk of personal injury or the risk that the employer will later lay off or
discharge the employees. Accordingly, employees undervalue the potential
costs from such risks in their negotiations with their employers, and a portion
of the actual costs become external to employers' decisions on how to
operate. 29 As a result, under individual bargaining employees will not ask for
adequate compensation for these risks, and employers will not have adequate
incentive to adopt all safeguards against such risks for which the benefits of
the safeguards exceed their costs.
30
Moreover, individual workers do not always have the resources or the
incentives to negotiate and enforce efficient contract terms with their
employer. Many terms of employment-the air quality in the workplace, the
lighting in the workplace, and the speed of the assembly line, for exam-
ple-are public goods, and improvements cannot be enjoyed by one worker
to the exclusion of other workers. 3 As a result, individual workers have
incentive to "free ride" on improvements in such goods negotiated by other
workers, resulting in an inefficiently low level of such public goods in the
workplace.32 Moreover, it is sometimes efficient for employees to enter into
long-term implicit contracts with their employer in which a portion of the
employees' income is deferred as an investment in firm-specific training or
as a guarantee against slacking.33 However, such agreements run a substan-
tial risk of breach because employers have incentive to discharge employees
before the employees receive the deferred compensation. Because individual
28. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE CosTs OF ACCIDENTS 91 (1970); Paul J.H. Schoemaker, The Expected
Utility Model: Its Variants, Purposes, Evidence and Limitations, 20 J. ECON. LIT. 529, 544-52 (1982).
29. Although imperfect information may also lead to overvaluation of the potential risks and their
costs, empirical evidence suggests that employees consistently undervalue such risks and their costs. See
Schoemaker, supra note 28, at 544-45. The fact that under the contractual regime of the common law
employers rarely insured employees against job hazards also suggests that employees systematically
undervalue such risks. This is evident because some of the risks of the time certainly merited insurance,
and the employers were probably the most efficient insurer relative to the employee since they were less
risk averse and had more knowledge and control of work risks.
30. VARIAN, supra note 24, at 548-52.
31. RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 8 (1984).
32. Id.
33. Michael L. Wachter & George M. Cohen, The Law and Economics of Collective Bargaining:
An Introduction and Application to the Problems of Subcontracting, Partial Closure, and Relocation,
136 U. PA. L. REv. 1349, 1359-60 (1988). Such long-term contracts remain implicit due to negotiation
and enforcement costs. Nevertheless, these contracts are efficient because they allow employees to invest
in firm-specific training and give employees incentive not to slack. If employees are caught slacking,
they will be discharged and lose the deferred income.
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employees cannot effectively enforce such long-term implicit contracts, they
do not negotiate them, with the result being that employees undertake too
little firm-specific training and employers undertake other, less efficient
efforts in monitoring employee effort.
3 4
Finally, individual employees do not have enough bargaining power to share
fully in potential proceeds of the firm or to prevent possible exploitation by
their employer. Markets are not always competitive. Employers may enjoy
market power rents in the product market or, perhaps, even monopsony power
rents in the labor market.35 Individually, employees cannot gain a share of
employer product market rents or prevent exploitation by an employer
monopsony in the labor market. 36 Even in a competitive market, widespread
distaste for associating with people of a certain race or gender and widespread
belief in stereotypes concerning the relative skills of people of different races
or gender can leave members of the disfavored class with limited opportuni-
ties that do not fully utilize or compensate them for their productive
capacity.37 Under individual bargaining, employees will receive only their
opportunity wage,38 which employer monopsony power or discrimination can
keep artificially low.
Given the decentralized nature of individual bargaining and its rough
association with wealth maximization, it is not surprising that individual
bargaining was the dominant means of accommodating inconsistent needs at
common law and was the first means used to address the demands of workers
in the United States. Although individual bargaining remains the dominant
method of addressing worker demands in the United States, given its
limitations, it was inevitable that the country would eventually try other
means. It would also seem inevitable that these other solutions would be
undertaken primarily in subject areas and using means that would address the
failures of individual bargaining to provide adequate bargaining power, to
34. Id. It is argued that the reputational effect of an employer violating such implicit contracts is
not an adequate check on employer strategic behavior due to imperfect information on the facts
concerning employment and discharge.
35. Traditionally, labor economists have thought that monopsony power in the labor market is rare
in the United States. However, even if one accepts this position, it may be that employer monopsony
power was historically important and one of the reasons for the passage of the National Labor Relations
Act. Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 988, 991-92 (1984).
36. Kenneth.G. Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining Analysis of American Labor Law and the Search for
Bargaining Equity and Industrial Peace, 91 MICH. L. REv. 419, 455-56 (1992).
37. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971). Sometimes, however,
the phenomenon of employment discrimination is perhaps best modeled as a taste for association with
certain individuals rather than as a distaste. See Matthew S. Goldberg, Discrimination, Nepotism, and
Lang-Run Wage Differentials, 97 Q.J. ECON. 307 (1982).
38. A worker's "opportunity wage" is the wage that the worker would receive in his or her next best
employment opportunity.
1993]
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allow the negotiation of efficient contract terms with respect to public goods,
to secure deferred income such as pensions, and to promote adequate
safeguards with respect to workplace risks.
B. Collective Bargaining
As an alternative to individual bargaining, workers might band together in
a union to negotiate their interests with their employer. As previously
discussed, at one time in our history it was even federal policy to encourage
collective bargaining as a means of addressing labor's problems.39
Collective bargaining provides a fairly decentralized solution to many of the
problems of individual bargaining. Although it can by no means address
individual needs to the same extent as individual bargaining, collective
bargaining still allows solutions specifically tailored to a firm or industry and
its employees. The workers and the employer who will have to live with the
bargain themselves determine what the most important problems are and what
their solutions will be.
Moreover, collectively employees can better address many of the problems
they might encounter in the workplace. Unions can hire professionals to
evaluate workplace risks such as long-term hazards from toxic chemicals.
Collectively, workers can more accurately express their preferences for public
goods, such as clean air in the workplace, because individual workers no
longer have incentives to hold back their demands.4" By giving workers a
collective voice to address workplace problems, unions can lower worker
turnover and thus reduce search and retraining costs.4 Unions can prevent
employer strategic behavior with respect to deferred compensation by
negotiating and enforcing seniority and just-cause discharge provisions and by
jointly administering pensions. Finally, collectively workers have the
bargaining power to gain a share of firm product market rents or to prevent
exploitation by an employer monopsony in the labor market. When confronted
with an effective union, an employer who enjoys rents from product or labor
market power must share those rents in order to continue the operation of his
or her firm.4 2
39. See supra text accompanying note 10.
40. FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 31, at 8-9.
41. Id. at 7-8.
42. Where an employer with a monopsony in the labor market confronts an effective union, if the
parties bargain so as to maximize the rent they divide, one can show that the parties will agree to
employment of the same amount of labor as would have been employed in a competitive market at the
same wage as would have prevailed in a competitive market. DAVEY ET AL., supra note 1, at 307-09.
Thus, a union can effectively prevent a monopsony employer from exploiting workers. The bargaining
problem between an employer who enjoys product market rents and an effective union is indeterminate.
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However, collective bargaining also has its limitations. In the course of
correcting problems with individual bargaining, unions can put their
employers at a competitive disadvantage or give employers incentive to
undertake inefficient acts, such as firing productive pro-union employees,
locking out employees, or moving the firm to a jurisdiction that is more
hostile to employee organization. By correcting problems of imperfect
information and inability to assess risk, for example, with respect to
hazardous chemicals, unions force employers to take account of and
internalize costs that would otherwise be absorbed by workers. Unorganized
employers, or employers who can break their employees' union, are free of
these costs and are therefore at a competitive advantage.43 Similarly, if a
union is successful in gaining a share of firm product market rents, it gives
the employer incentive to relocate or to bust the union, even when there is no
efficiency reason for such action. If an employer can successfully free himself
or herself of a union, the employer can regain the share of rents that was
captured by the employees.
Moreover, unions can sometimes cause inefficiencies in production and
consumption. Some unions may choose to gain higher wages at the expense
of jobs, bargaining with their employer to sacrifice the positions of future or
less senior employees for the benefit of current senior employees." Unions
may also sometimes be successful in establishing a labor cartel so that they
can directly constrain the supply of labor to drive up wages.45 Where unions
restrict labor supply to a firm or a market, they dislocate workers to other
employers or markets and increase the price of the good to consumers. The
inefficiencies caused by such constraints on labor supply also give the
employer incentive to undertake potentially costly efforts to escape the
43. For example, if American workers organize and become cognizant of the risks posed by certain
dangerous chemicals, they will want to be compensated for that risk, thereby giving their employer
incentive to reduce the risk to the efficient level. However, if the employer can move the plant to
Mexico, where there is no effective worker organization or cognizance of the hazards involved, the
employer can continue production without compensating workers for their risk or taking efficient
precautions. Under such circumstances, producers in Mexico will be at a competitive advantage and will
be able to produce the product at a lower price, even if American and Mexican wages are otherwise
equalized after accounting for differences in productivity.
44. Unions may do this either by bargaining over employer product rents or by forcing the employer
to pay union wage increases out of quasi-rents on machinery, thereby discouraging future employer
investment in the firm. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 36, at 430-31, 439 n.65.
45. It has been argued that the actual cartelization of labor markets by labor unions is rarer than is
commonly supposed under the traditional economic analysis of labor unions. ld. at 423, 468-73; Daniel
R. Fischel, Labor Markets and Labor Law Compared with Capital Markets and Corporate Law, 51 U.
CHi. L. Rav. 1061, 1072-73 (1984).
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union.46 Although empirical studies suggest that unions cause only small
inefficiencies over the economy as a whole, 7 these inefficiencies may be
significant in particular occupations or industries.
Finally, due to the costs of collective bargaining and the democratic nature
of unions, collective bargaining will never be an effective means of address-
ing the needs of all workers. Organizing a union is costly for employees in
terms of time, membership dues, and the willingness to suffer possible
strategic behavior by the employer, such as discriminatory discharges or
lockouts. Employees in industries where job tenure is transient, or employees
who are particularly susceptible to employer strategic behavior because they
are easily replaced or have few resources, will not undertake the costs of
forming a union, even though workers in the industry as a whole could benefit
greatly from such organization. In addition, because they are democratic
organizations, unions respond to the will of the majority of their members. As
a result, unions are not a promising means for responding to the unique
demands of an insular minority. For example, although there have been
exceptions," historically unions have not been in the vanguard of those
seeking to address the problems of race and sex discrimination.49
Due to its decentralized nature and its potential to address a broad range of
problems, it is not surprising that collective bargaining was among the first
of the alternate means of meeting workers' needs used in response to the
failures of individual bargaining. Although collective bargaining is still an
important means of addressing the needs of workers in the United States, the
fortunes of organized labor in America have recently suffered a precipitous
decline."
46. Unlike where the employer acts to avoid unionization in order to continue to externalize costs
or to recapture product market rents, where the employer acts to avoid unionization due to constraints
on labor supply, such acts and their costs can be efficient because the employer is helping to undermine
a labor cartel and improve efficiency.
47. ALBERT REES, THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE UNIONS 94-95 (3d ed. 1989); Robert H. DeFina,
Unions, Relative Wages, and Economic Efficiency I J. LAB. ECON. 408,428 (1983) (estimating that even
under the monopoly model of unions the total production and consumption efficiency loss for the
economy as a whole is approximately 0.2%); Albert Rees, The Effects of Unions on Resource Allocation,
6 J.L. & ECON. 69 (1963).
48. For example, the United Auto Workers was one of the groups that organized the civil rights
march on Washington in 1963 at which Dr. Martin Luther King gave his much celebrated "I Have a
Dream" speech. A variety of labor organizations supported the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 31, at 192.
49. Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (enforcing labor organization's duty to
represent African-American members' claims).
50. In the 1950s, the percentage of private sector non-agricultural workers who were organized
approached 40% and as late as 1970 it was around 30%. FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 31, at 222.
The figure is currently under 15%. PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 105 (1990).
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There are several reasons for this decline. First, the demographics of the
American work force have changed so that there are now proportionately more
young workers, women workers, and white-collar workers in the paid labor
force." Women and the young tend to be more transient workers, and
therefore harder to organize, while white-collar workers have traditionally
disdained organization. Second, increases in the level of international
competition in many manufacturing industries have decreased employer
product market rents and thus lessened the benefits to be gained through
organization in those industries.52 With declines in the rents employees can
obtain through organization, unions in these industries have had to make wage
concessions and have had less luck in organizing. 3 Finally, as currently
formulated and interpreted, the National Labor Relations Act does not
adequately protect employees from employer strategic behavior or adequately
encourage employers to negotiate collective agreements with their employees
once the employees have decided to organize. Penalties under the Act are too
small to act as an adequate deterrent and there are just too many opportunities
under the Act for employers to delay or avoid bargaining responsibilities.54
These deficiencies in the law, combined with recent increases in employers'
efforts to resist unions, have substantially contributed to the decline of unions
in the United States."
With the decline of collective bargaining and the growing realization that
this means of addressing workers' needs will never adequately meet the needs
of some workers, namely transient, low-skill workers and minority workers,
American workers have sought other means through which their demands
might be met.
51. FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 31, at 224-26.
52. See, e.g., William B. Gould IV, Reflections on Workers' Participation, Influence and
Powersharing: The Future of Industrial Relations, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 381, 382 (1989); James V.
Higgins, Unionized Auto Plants Losing Ground, DETRor NEWS, Sept. 27, 1991, at El; John Holusha,
Unions Are Expanding Their Role to Survive in the 90's, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1990, at F12.
53. Holusha, supra note 52, at F12.
54. FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 31, at 233-43; Paul C. Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing
Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983) [hereinafter
Promises to Keep]; Paul C. Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects
for Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REv. 351 (1984).
55. FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 31, at 233-43. Also, see generally Joel Rogers, Divide and
Conquer: Further "Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Laws," 1990 Wis. L.
REv. 1, on the post-war decline of organized labor under American labor law.
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C. Legislative Regulation of the Employment Relationship
Yet another possible means of addressing employee demands is the adoption
of state or federal legislation governing aspects of the employment relation-
ship. Worker interests that are not addressed through individual or collective
bargaining may find expression in the ballot box.
Addressing worker demands through legislation has several advantages. Like
collective bargaining, legislation can solve many of the problems of individual
bargaining. The government can enact laws holding employers strictly liable
for workplace injuries or health hazards, thus giving employers incentive to
take efficient precautions. 6 In addition, the government can employ experts
to evaluate workplace risks and use these evaluations as the basis for statutes
or regulations which define the precautions employers must undertake to
lessen those risks. The government can also provide solutions to the public
good problem by acting as the workers' collective voice in specifying the
levels that should prevail in the workplace for public goods such as safety and
cleanliness. Furthermore, the government can discourage the worst forms of
employer strategic behavior under implicit contracts, for example, by
prohibiting employers from discharging long-term employees just before
retirement to prevent the employees from obtaining a pension.57
Legislation addressing worker demands can also solve some of the problems
associated with collective bargaining. Although employees are fired for union
activity with disturbing regularity,58 the secrecy of the voting booth prevents
employers from firing workers based on the votes they cast for elected
56. The government would have to prohibit employees from waiving such employer liability.
Otherwise, the employees would simply bargain away their rights based on their inadequate appraisals
of workplace risks.
57. See ERISA § 510,29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988). The periodic vesting of pensions under ERISA also
discourages employer opportunistic behavior by lessening the incentive to discharge employees at any
given time to prevent them from getting a pension.
The government can also address the problem of redistributing employer product market rents through
taxes, antitrust policy, or the promotion of collective bargaining. In addition, to the extent the
government corrects inefficiencies that arise due to imperfect information or inability to assess risk, the
government will redistribute wealth since costs that were previously borne by the workers will now be
borne by the employer. However, in general the government cannot affect the distribution of wealth
between the two parties by creating entitlements with respect to the employment relationship, save to
the extent such entitlements change the relative bargaining power of unions and employers, because the
parties here already have a contractual relationship. Stewart J. Schwab, Collective Bargaining and the
Coase Theorem, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 245, 262-63 (1987). For example, if the law requires employers
to bear a risk that the employees previously knowingly bore and for which the employees received a
compensating wage, after the enactment of the law the employees will not bear the risk, but they will
also no longer receive the compensating wage, leaving the relative position of the parties with respect
to wealth unchanged.
58. FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 31, at 232-33; Promises to Keep, supra note 54, at 1779-81.
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offices. In addition, although collective bargaining will never be a realistic
remedy for workers in some industries, legislation can reach as many workers
as is allowed by the resources the legislature and executive commit to the
problem.
As with the other solutions, government regulation of the employment
relationship has its limitations. Although solutions on an industry-wide basis
are still possible, legislation cannot offer solutions as particularized as those
provided by the more decentralized methods of individual and collective
bargaining. Moreover, to the extent that legislators or administrators are
mistaken about the need to correct a problem, government regulation can
introduce inefficiency into the production process. For example, if the
government were to specify that industry should reduce worker exposure to
"the extent technically feasible," 59 rather than to the level where the costs
of additional precautions outweigh their benefits,6" then firms may be forced
to undertake precautions for which the benefits do not exceed the costs.
6
'
Finally, even if the legislation does correct an inefficiency caused by
individual bargaining, regulation can still give employers incentive to move
to a jurisdiction that does not make this correction, or it can place regulated
employers at a competitive disadvantage relative to firms that are already
located in less progressive jurisdictions. For example, if neither American nor
Mexican employees fully realize the dangers of exposure to a certain
chemical, and the U.S. government imposes an obligation on its employers to
take efficient precautions while the Mexican government does not, then such
regulation will impose a cost on American producers that is not borne by
firms in Mexico, thereby putting firms located in the United States at a
competitive disadvantage, even though the regulation merely requires efficient
precautions.
59. This standard is similar but not identical to the actual current standard for rules promulgated
on the exposure of workers to toxic chemicals under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA).
See American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981) (interpreting OSHA § 6(b)(5)).
The actual current standard also considers the effect of the rule on the economic viability of affected
industries. Id.
60. Of course, estimating the benefits of a safety or health precaution involves the empirically and
philosophically challenging task of placing a dollar value on human life. See Steven E. Rhoads, How
Much Should We Spend to Save a Life?, 51 PuB. INTEREST 74 (1978); Richard Zeckhauser, Procedures
for Valuing Lives, 23 PuB. POr.'y 419 (1975).
61. Of course, there may be normative reasons why society would want firms to undertake even
inefficient precautions. Efficiency is just one of several values human beings hold dear in their
normative judgments. When I point out that certain practices are inefficient, I am merely making a
positive observation that inefficiency occurs rather than a normative judgment that this consideration
should outweigh all others.
1993]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Government regulation is currently the preferred alternative to individual
bargaining as a means of addressing worker concerns. The current regime of
legislative regulation of the workplace began with workers' compensation
statutes that sought to ensure that employers compensated workers for, and
took account of, the costs of safety and health risks in the workplace. The
popularity of such regulation grew at the beginning of this century when the
nature of workplace risks became significantly more complex with the advent
of modern manufacturing methods. 2 Later, as it became apparent that
collective bargaining would not address all the problems of workers, the
legislative agenda was expanded to include problems such as discrimina-
tion,63 pension security, 64 and plant-closing notification,6s and further
legislation with respect to health and safety.6 6 The pursuit of legislation to
address these problems enjoys a benefit relative to collective bargaining in
that workers who support such legislation are not subject to discharge for that
support. With the increased participation of women in the paid work force, the
legislative agenda has taken a turn towards problems that concern women and
two-earner households, namely comparable worth,67 sexual harassment, 8
and parental leave.69 One potential limit on the use of legislation that looms
ominously on the horizon is the recent increase in international trade. As
previously discussed, even when legislation successfully addresses failures of
individual bargaining and promotes efficiency, such legislation can put
American firms at a competitive disadvantage relative to firms in other
countries that do not address these failures.7"
62. POSNER, supra note 26, at 334-35.
63. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
64. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
65. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1988).
66. OSHA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988). Note that the regulatory efforts in the OSHA are not
entirely duplicative of workers' compensation in terms of giving adequate incentives to reduce industrial
accidents and illnesses. Because current workers' compensation laws do not require employers to pay
the employees' full wage loss from accidents or to compensate employees for industrial illnesses that
are hard to prove are job related, they do not prompt employers to take adequate precautions with
respect to health risks that employees cannot properly evaluate but that might be efficiently regulated
through an OSHA standard.
67. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 471.991-.999 (West 1992).
68. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scattered sections
of U.S.C.) (making it clear that the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 allows damages for
sexual harassment); Stuart H. Bompey & John D. Giansello, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: An Analysis,
in THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991: ITS IMPACT ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION 87, 97
(1992).
69. Family Leave and Medical Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat 6 (to be codified in
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 5 U.S.C., and 29 U.S.C.).
70. See supra text accompanying note 62.
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D. Development of the Common Law
A final means of addressing the needs of workers is for the courts to amend
the common law to meet those needs more fully. For example, rather than
having the legislature pass a law, the courts might adopt a doctrine that holds
employers strictly liable for all accidents or illnesses in the workplace.7'
Adaptation of the common law can solve some of the problems of
individual bargaining. Holding employers strictly liable for the health hazards
of the workplace would compensate employees and give employers incentive
to reduce those hazards, at least for those harms that could later be sufficient-
ly traced back to the workplace. 72 Such strict liability would also encourage
employers to identify and minimize workplace hazards even before those
hazards result in deaths or injuries. Similarly, the courts could prohibit the
most extreme cases of employer strategic behavior that violates implicit
contracts. For example, the courts could prohibit employers from discharging
employees where the motive for the discharge is to avoid paying a commis-
sion or pension already earned.73
There are of course disadvantages to this approach. Litigation is very costly.
Along with time and lawyers' fees, employees rarely have a bright future with
an employer they take to court. Because court solutions come after the fact
and defendants can be judgment-proof, amendment of the common law does
not work well with new risks of substantial size since the employer may be
bankrupt by the time the harms caused by the conditions of employment
become apparent. The recent bankruptcy filings of asbestos processing firms
in the face of employee and consumer lawsuits amply demonstrate this
shortcoming.74 Moreover, repeat players in litigation, such as employers who
71. The courts, of course, cannot allow workers to waive such liability on the part of the employer
since employers will merely have employees sign blanket waivers before they begin work, which the
employees will gladly do at minimal or no cost because they do not adequately understand the health
risks of the workplace.
72. Some manifestations of industrial risks, for example, cancer and heart attacks, are sufficiently
ambiguous in origin that ex post determinations of liability probably cannot provide adequate
compensation to employees or incentive to employers to take care. Was the onset of the employee's
cancer caused by chemicals the employee was exposed to on the job, a genetic predisposition, or
cigarette smoking?
73. Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977). There are limits to this
remedy, however, because it is difficult to prove breaches of these agreements in court, which is also
one reason they stay implicit. See supra note 34.
74. See, e.g., Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988). Johns-Manville, once the
world's largest miner of asbestos and manufacturer of insulation materials, filed for bankruptcy under
the weight of over 12,500 actual suits and 100,000 potential suits from persons already exposed to
asbestos. Id. at 639. For a discussion of the Johns-Manville cases, see Stacy L. Rahl, Note, Modification
of a Chapter 11 Plan in the Mass Tort Context, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 192 (1992).
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are sued by many employees, tend to have an adVantage over nonrepeat
players, such as individual employees who sue their employer only once. The
precedential value of the case gives the repeat player more incentive to
litigate and appeal than the nonrepeat player." Finally, as with collective
bargaining and legislation, common-law doctrines favorable to workers in one
jurisdiction can put employers in that jurisdiction at a competitive disadvan-
tage relative to employers in other jurisdictions. For example, if courts in
Indiana hold employers strictly liable for workplace hazards, while courts in
Kentucky do not, employers in Indiana will bear the costs of hazards that
were undervalued by employees, while employers in Kentucky will not. Once
again, this result occurs despite the fact that it may be efficient to hold
employers strictly liable the costs of workplace injuries.
The state of the common law with respect to employer and employee
relations remained inert in this country for many decades. Indeed, it was the
failure of the courts to adapt the common law to changed industrial conditions
that gave much of the impetus to early legislative initiatives in employment
relations. When combined with the exigent circumstances of the Great
Depression, the courts' failure finally led to the New Deal legislation that
sought to encourage collective bargaining and to regulate various aspects of
the employment relationship. 6 However, adaptation of the common law to
the needs of workers has enjoyed a modest rebirth of late, at least on the
subject of employee discharges and the employment-at-will doctrine.7 This
rebirth is perhaps attributable to the fact that the courts have become more
accustomed to the idea of new rights and relationships in industrial relations
under the new legislative regime, 8 and to the fact that it has now become
clear that, at least in the short run, collective bargaining will serve as a means
of addressing employee demands for only a very limited number of employ-
ees. 9 Given its limitations, however, it seems unlikely that adaptation of the
common law will ever become the primary means of addressing employee
demands in this country.
75. Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 55-56 (1977).
Employers also generally have more resources than employees, which, given imperfections in the capital
market, give them an advantage in costly litigation.
76. Cox ET AL., supra note 1, at 84-87.
77. See supra text accompanying note 19.
78. HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL: LAW AND PRACrIcE § 1.10 (2d ed. 1987). For
example, judges accustomed to giving employees remedies for employment discrimination find it
incongruous that they would not be able to compensate or reinstate employees who were fired for
refusing to break the law or that the employer can avoid paying employees a commission that was
already earned.
79. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
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II. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
What are the implications of this analysis for the future of labor and
employment law? While the short-term implications are not very startling, for
the long term my analysis portends a great challenge and a need for change.
In the short term, I would expect all current trends to continue. Individual
bargaining will remain the dominant means of addressing worker demands in
the United States. The slow strangulation of unions in the private sector will
continue, although this trend may be somewhat abated as unions develop
strategies for organizing and meeting the needs of white-collar workers. A
comprehensive package of labor-law reforms, including substantially increased
penalties for violations of the National Labor Relations Act,8" abbreviated
proceedings for determining union representation in order to preclude
employer interference, 8' expansion of the mandatory subjects of bargain-
ing,8" and a prohibition on the permanent replacement of striking employ-
ees,83 could help reverse this decline, but the chance of such legislation in
the short run seems remote given the ability of even a small number of
senators to block the passage of such reform. 84 However, because its benefits
are more broadly enjoyed and because employees who support progressive
legislation are not subject to employer strategic behavior, the pace of uniform
regulation governing the employment relationship will remain unimpeded, and
may even quicken with the recent election of President Clinton. Responding
to changes in the demographics of the paid work force, these legislative
efforts will be aimed at the problems of women and two-earner families in the
workplace. These are likely to include enactment of federal legislation on
child care, proportional benefits for part-time employees, and health
insurance, as well as the recent enactment of the family leave bill.85 The
current review of the employment-at-will doctrine by the courts will continue,
but given the costs of litigation and the limited possibilities for addressing
80. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 36.
81. Promises to Keep, supra note 54, at 1811-16.
82. See Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern
Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265, 307-09 (1978).
83. See, e.g., H.R. 5, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991).
84. This power was amply demonstrated in the fight over fairly modest labor law reform in 1978
when a majority in both houses of Congress and the President favored labor law reform but were
thwarted by a determined minority in the Senate. BARBARA TOWNLEY, LABOR LAW REFORM IN US
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (1986); Gerald E. Rosen, Labor Law Reform: Dead or Alive?, 57 U. DET. J.
URB. L. 1 (1979).
85. Family Leave and Medical Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (to be codified in
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 5 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
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worker demands through the evolution of the common law, I do not see the
courts developing into the leading forum for addressing workers' needs.
However, in the long term, the United States will have to come to terms
with the fact that it now operates in a global economy. As discussed above,
the use of collective bargaining, regulation of the employment relationship,
or adaptation of the common law to address the needs of workers can give
employers incentive to relocate to foreign countries that do not address these
problems. Even if American employers do not send their capital overseas, the
fact that the United States might try to address some of the shortcomings of
individual bargaining through these alternative methods of addressing worker
demands means that U.S. firms will be placed at a competitive disadvantage
relative to firms in countries that do not try to address these shortcomings. If
the United States is to continue to meet the demands of workers, it will have
to encourage other countries to do the same thing-either through internation-
al treaties or by placing tariffs on goods from countries that engage in "unfair
methods of competition," such as exposing their workers to unsafe levels of
hazardous chemicals or allowing the exploitation of their workers by labor
monopsonies.86 The alternatives are merely to be content to lose the jobs in
industries where failure to address the problems of individual bargaining
yields substantial competitive advantages or to hope that workers in countries
less fortunate and less democratic than our own will be able to compel their
employers and their governments to adequately address these problems.
On the positive side for unions, I imagine that in the long term producers
in various international markets will organize in oligopolies or cartels that will
yield employer product market rents.87 These rents could serve as a source
of union wage and benefit increases that could fuel an international movement
to organize labor. American history shows that as employers organized on
first a regional and then a national basis, workers, of necessity, also organized
on a regional and national basis.88 Assuming that unions can form the
associations that will be necessary to organize internationally, and that
sufficient numbers of countries retain or enact legislation that allows
86. Then-Governor Clinton recognized the need for such efforts in response to questions on the
North American Free Trade Agreement during the third presidential debate of 1992. The 92 Vote: The
Third Presidential Debate (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 19, 1992), transcript available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Trancript File. Such treaties or tariffs will also probably be necessary to take care of
other externalities on an international basis, such as ocean dumping, air pollution, and the exploitation
of exhaustible resources over which no country exercises exclusive control.
87. There are already several international cartels organized by, or with the blessings of, various
governments, for example, in oil and diamonds. There are also signs of increased cooperation among
firms in various international markets that may be the prelude to collusion. See Stanley J. Modic,
Strategic Alliances, INDUSTRY WK., Oct. 3, 1988, at 46.
88. COX ET AL., supra note 1, at 12-17; DAVEY E AL., supra note 1, at 18-22.
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collective bargaining, the product market rents earned by international cartels
will provide an incentive and reward for labor organizing on an international
basis.
In the end, of course, the extent to which American labor and employment
law will meet the demands of workers in the twenty-first century will depend
on the efforts of those workers to pursue their interests in the available legal
forums. It is only through the imagination and hard work of these people in
organizing, lobbying for legislative change, and pursuing their claims in court
that the unique interests of the wage class have found expression in the
American social and political agendas. As long as this class of wage workers
with its distinct interests exists, there will also exist the need to give
expression to those interests through bargaining, political action, and
litigation.

